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Abstract
A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The
project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold,
and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm’s
optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guaran-
tees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently
based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment thresh-
old is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller
investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm’s
payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential
driver of inequality.
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Firms often have worthwhile projects that require the participation of mul-
tiple investors. A key problem is that these investors face strategic risk: if not
enough of them choose to invest, the firm will not have enough capital to im-
plement its project and generate a return. As a result, there may be outcomes
in which some or all the investors choose not to invest because they expect
that others will not invest. These outcomes are bad for the firm and typically
inefficient.
This paper studies the firm’s optimal scheme that guarantees investment as
the unique outcome. In a world without contracting constraints, where payments
can be made contingent on third parties’ choices, eliminating the possibility of
bad outcomes would impose no extra cost on the firm. But the real world is not
unconstrained, and as pointed out by the literature, bilateral contracts are often
all a firm can rely on.1 Guaranteeing investment then requires compensating
investors for their strategic risk, a risk that depends on the amount of capital
each investor pledges. A natural question arises: how does heterogeneity in
investor size affect the firm’s scheme and the returns yielded to the firm and the
investors? In particular, does an optimal scheme treat investors differently based
on size, and, if so, which investors get better terms? How does the distribution of
capital among investors affect the firm’s profits and the feasibility of investment?
Our model consists of a firm and a set of agents. The firm owns a project that
generates a surplus if implemented, and each agent has an amount of capital to
invest, which varies across the agents. The firm’s project can be implemented—
i.e., the project “succeeds”—only if the capital raised from the agents exceeds
a stochastic, initially unknown threshold.2 The firm offers each agent two pay-
ments for investing, one if the project succeeds and another if it fails. Each
agent then chooses whether to invest with the firm or put her capital in a safe
asset that pays a fixed net return. We characterize the firm’s optimal unique-
implementation scheme. This scheme specifies individual capital amounts and
the least-cost payments such that investing these amounts with the firm is the
1See Section 1 as well as the discussions in Innes and Sexton (1994) and Segal (2003).
2This threshold captures common factors such as the project involving inputs whose prices
are random, or the firm having a stochastic source of external credit to use as additional
funding. More abstractly, our model simply assumes that the probability of project success is
increasing in the amount of capital invested.
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unique Nash equilibrium outcome.3
Our first main result addresses how the optimal returns that the firm offers
vary with investor size, given a fixed set of investors. We show that if the project
fails, the firm simply refunds the agents their capital, thus paying the same zero
net return to each of them.4 However, if the project succeeds, the firm pays
the agents differential net returns depending on the size of their investments.
Under a distributional condition on the investment threshold (which we discuss
subsequently), we show that agents investing larger amounts of capital receive
higher net returns (per unit of capital) than those investing smaller amounts.
This pattern is consistent with evidence from private equity, where large limited
partners are given preferential terms compared to small ones (see, e.g., Clayton,
2017). By showing that larger investors get more per unit invested, this result
also yields important implications for dynamic capital markets: we identify
a mechanism through which capital becomes dispersed, pointing to “winner-
takes-all dynamics” such as those that arise in tournament theory and models
of superstars (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1981).
Our second main result concerns the optimal set of investors for the firm.
Fixing the total amount of capital, we find that the firm benefits from dealing
with agents whose capital is more unequal. Specifically, any increase in the
dispersion of agents’ capital (in the sense of majorization, i.e. concentrating
capital in the hands of a small number of agents) reduces the firm’s cost of raising
any given level of capital. Higher dispersion in investor size therefore increases
the firm’s expected payoff from any given investment, as well as the range of
investments that are feasible. Furthermore, as an implication, we find that the
firm targets those agents with the largest endowments of capital, generating
differences not only in agents’ net investment returns but also in their access to
investment opportunities.
Our last main result considers the relationship between the distribution of
capital and the distribution of returns. One might be tempted to conclude from
3See Section 1 for details. Our unique implementation requirement is equivalent to having
the firm maximize its expected payoff in its worst possible equilibrium outcome.
4This result applies to our benchmark setting with no initial firm capital. If the firm owns
initial capital, a subset of the agents are paid a positive net return under failure; yet, as shown
in Section 4, our qualitative conclusions are unchanged.
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our previous results that not only larger investors are offered higher net returns,
but also their return advantage is larger when the agents’ investments are more
unequal. We show that the opposite is true, in the following sense: higher
capital dispersion reduces the difference in net returns between the largest and
smallest investors. In fact, we find that this return difference can decline to the
extent that even the difference in the investors’ final capital holdings declines
when initial capital becomes more unequal.
To provide intuition for these results, we next describe a simple example.
Consider a project that requires I units of capital to succeed, where the threshold
I is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 30]. If the project succeeds, it
generates a fixed surplus A > 0 in addition to the initial investment. Suppose A
is large enough that the firm wishes to guarantee full investment by two agents,
where agent 1 has 10 units of capital and agent 2 has 20 units. The agents’
outside option is to invest in a safe asset that pays a net return of 10%.
In this simple example, the project succeeds for sure if both agents invest
with the firm. Hence, paying each agent a net return under success equal to the
safe return of 10% would suffice to induce an equilibrium in which both agents
invest. However, an equilibrium in which neither agent invests would also exist
given this (or a slightly higher) return. To implement full investment as the
unique equilibrium outcome, the firm must make it dominant for one of the
agents to invest.
Consider first a scheme that makes investment dominant for agent 1. If
only agent 1 invests, the project succeeds with probability 1/3, namely the
probability that the investment threshold is I ≤ 10. To ensure that agent 1
invests no matter what agent 2 does, it thus suffices to offer her a net return
under success (slightly above) r satisfying r/3 = 10%, i.e. r = 30%. Given agent
1’s participation, it then suffices to offer agent 2 a net return of 10% for her to
also invest. It follows that the firm can guarantee full investment at a cost of
10(30%) + 20(10%) = 5.
The alternative is to make investment dominant for agent 2. If only agent 2
invests, the project succeeds provided that I ≤ 20, which occurs with probability
2/3. Thus, it suffices to offer agent 2 a net return under success of 15% to
guarantee her participation. Since agent 1 will then invest as well if she is
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offered at least 10%, the firm’s cost is now equal to 10(10%) + 20(15%) = 4,
which is lower than under the previous scheme. Intuitively, agent 2’s larger
investment provides her with more self-insurance compared to agent 1, and this
allows the firm to pay a lower compensation for risk when agent 2’s participation
is made dominant. Consequently, the firm uses a scheme that pays a higher net
return to the large investor compared to the small investor. This illustrates our
first main result.
Consider next transferring capital from the small to the large investor. For
example, suppose we transfer 4 units of capital from agent 1 to agent 2, so that
the capital of agent 1 becomes 6 and that of agent 2 becomes 24. Following
analogous steps to those above, the firm’s scheme in this case entails a net
return under success of 12.5% for agent 2 and 10% for agent 1. The firm’s cost
is equal to 6(10%) + 24(12.5%) = 3.6, which is lower than the cost of 4 prior to
the transfer. Because the large investor becomes better self-insured when her
capital is increased, the overall compensation for risk that the firm has to pay
declines. We thus obtain that when the distribution of capital is more unequal,
the firm’s expected payoff is higher, and a lower surplus A from success suffices
for the investment to be profitable. This illustrates our second main result. Our
third main result is also clear in this exercise: the difference in the agents’ net
returns is smaller when their investments are more heterogeneous.
Our paper examines a general setting in which the number of agents and their
capital levels are arbitrary, as is the distribution of the investment threshold
I. We identify a condition on the distribution function of I under which our
results hold for all capital distributions. The condition is that the reciprocal of
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) be convex, a property implied by log-
concavity of the cdf and thus satisfied by most commonly used distributions.5
Our analysis elucidates the role of this condition and how our findings change if it
is not satisfied. In the example above, the condition implies a risk premium per
unit of capital which declines at a decreasing rate with the agents’ investments,
and this is why the firm minimizes costs by first guaranteeing the participation
of the large investor.
5These include the exponential, gamma, log-normal, Pareto, and uniform distributions (see
Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).
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We discuss different extensions and implications of our model. We show that
our results apply to a setting in which the firm has some initial capital of its
own. The firm in this case uses its capital to fully insure small investors, thus
continuing to offer higher net returns to larger investors and delivering different
levels of risk for investors of different size. Our results also apply to a general
equilibrium setting in which the investors’ outside options are endogenously
determined. Moreover, while derived for a firm that maximizes its profits, our
findings are also relevant to a social planner concerned with agents’ welfare.
Beyond capital raising, we discuss how our model may be applied to other
contracting problems with externalities. These include a monopolist offering
exclusive dealing contracts to buyers to deter market entry; a firm rewarding
workers to complete a joint task; and a bank offering interest and collateral to
depositors to prevent a run. Heterogeneity is common in these situations, and
our results can be useful to understand its implications.
A broad insight from our analysis is that strategic risk may be a driver of
inequality. A profit-maximizing mechanism favors certain agents in order to pin
down their choices and reduce the strategic risk on the part of other agents.
We show that under a plausible condition, the more favorable terms are given
to those agents who are already in a more favorable position. The mechanism
therefore exacerbates initial differences among the agents, and it also extracts
increased revenues from these differences. Inequality being undesirable for a
number of reasons that we do not study, our paper uncovers important economic
forces that may be behind it. We discuss policy implications for a social planner
in Section 5.
Related literature. Our model is one of multi-agent contracting, similar to
models used in the literature on contracting with externalities pioneered by Segal
(1999, 2003) (see also Bernstein and Winter, 2012).6 These are abstract models
with externalities among the agents which are exogenously given. In contrast,
we consider an applied problem in which the externalities among the agents are
endogenously determined by the firm’s contract offers.
Our main departure from the literature is that we study agents who are
6Most such models focus on unique implementation like we do; see Section 1.3.
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heterogeneous in their endowments. Our analysis of course also has implications
for the case in which the agents are homogeneous: we find that the firm’s optimal
scheme gives investors differential net returns even if they all have the same
amount of capital. This is analogous to the results in Winter (2004), where an
optimal team incentive scheme is shown to discriminate among identical workers.
Similar results appear in Segal (2003) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2015), as well as in
Inostroza and Pavan (2018) in the context of persuasion. Given that an optimal
scheme creates heterogeneity among homogenous agents, our paper examines
the natural question of how the scheme deals with heterogeneous agents, and in
doing so it reveals implications for inequality.
Two related papers that analyze heterogeneity are Bernstein and Winter
(2012) and Sa´kovics and Steiner (2012). Unlike our model, neither of these fea-
ture contingent payments: the principal offers fixed subsidies for the agents to
participate in the mechanism, and agents’ benefits from participating and their
externalities are exogenous. Bernstein and Winter (2012) study how asymme-
tries in the agents’ bilateral externalities affect the principal’s scheme and rev-
enue. Instead, we look directly at differences in agents’ attributes, whose effects
on the matrix of externalities may be complex and endogenous.7 Sa´kovics and
Steiner (2012) consider a global game with incomplete information, where agents
differ in their influence over the aggregate action, their benefit from project suc-
cess, and their cost of investment. Importantly, these papers are silent about
our main object of study, namely the per-dollar returns on investment. These
returns and their dependence on investors’ wealth are the crux of the persistent
inequality that we show is generated by the firm’s capital raising.
In this regard, the most closely related paper to ours is Akerlof and Holden
(2019).8 In independent work, the authors consider a principal who has access
to a production technology and faces a set of investors. The production function
achieves a global maximum at a high level of investment, has a local maximum
7In fact, while in our model the magnitude of an investor’s externality is related to size,
we find that the relationship between size and contract terms depends on a distributional
condition, so a higher externality does not necessarily imply more favorable terms as in Bern-
stein and Winter. The difference arises primarily from the fact that here agents’ externalities
are neither bilateral nor additive. In our framework, the externality that an agent exerts on
another agent’s gains depends on who else is in the pool of investors.
8See also Akerlof and Holden (2016).
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at a low level, and is such that for an intermediate range the output would
not suffice to compensate investors for their outside options. The paper first
analyzes a setting with many identical small investors. If the principal seeks
to raise the high investment level while offering investors their outside option,
there is an equilibrium in which investors invest less and the principal gets zero
payoff. As a result, the principal seeks to raise the low level of investment. The
authors then contrast this setting with one in which there is a large investor in
addition to the small investors. If the principal offers the large investor a junior
debt claim and promises her a fraction of the surplus generated by the high
investment, then both the large and small investors invest and high investment
is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Our paper differs from Akerlof and Holden (2019) in a number of aspects.
First, they show that by facilitating investment, a large investor can earn a
high return if he has some bargaining power vis-a-vis the principal. If the large
investor is instead a price-taker as the small ones, then all investors get the
same net return regardless of size. In contrast, in our model all the bargaining
power is in the hands of the firm, and the firm offers higher net returns to
larger investors to guarantee itself a maximum payoff. Put differently, we take
a mechanism design approach to solve for an optimal unique-implementation
scheme, whereas Akerlof and Holden (2019) provide an equilibrium analysis
that shows how outcomes vary with the environment. Second, while their paper
focuses on the role of large investors in improving overall investment, we study
how the firm and investors’ payoffs depend on the distribution of capital. In
fact, unlike in Akerlof and Holden (2019), the firm in our model benefits from
targeting larger investors, and offers them a higher net return compared to
smaller investors, even if the overall investment is kept unchanged.
Finally, our paper is also related to Andreoni (1998), which studies the role
of seed money in charitable contributions. Since the success of such fundraising
relies on a minimum threshold of funds, contributions from seed donors increase
the incentives of other donors to also contribute.
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1 Model
1.1 Setup
A firm owns a project which yields a fixed surplus A > 0 if implemented.
The firm can implement the project only if the capital invested in it exceeds
an initially unknown, stochastic threshold I. We assume that I has a twice
differentiable distribution function F with support
[
0, I
]
, for some I > 0.9
Hence, if capital x is invested, with probability F (x) the threshold satisfies
I ≤ x and the project is implemented, yielding final capital x + A.10 With the
remaining probability 1 − F (x) the threshold is I > x and the project is not
implemented, so the final capital is x. We will refer to project implementation
as success and to no implementation as failure.
We begin by assuming that the firm has no capital of its own, deferring
the study of how the firm would use any initial capital to Section 4. The firm
raises capital from a set of N > 1 heterogeneous agents, indexed by n ∈ S =
{1, . . . , N}. Each agent n has a capital endowment xn > 0. Instead of investing
with the firm, agents can invest their capital in a safe asset that pays a net
return θ > 0.11 (All returns are net percentage returns, meaning that if agent
n invests xn in the safe asset, her payoff is (1 + θ)xn.) All of this is common
knowledge.
The order of moves is as follows. First, the firm offers each agent a contract
specifying payments in the events of project success and failure, as we describe
in the next subsection. These are publicly observable contracts to which the
firm commits. Second, the agents decide simultaneously whether to invest with
the firm or put their capital in the safe asset. Finally, the investment threshold
9Setting the lower bound of the support to zero simplifies the exposition. As will be clear
in the next sections, our results are unchanged so long as this bound is smaller than the largest
investor’s amount of capital, and our problem is moot otherwise.
10In Section 5, we show that our results also apply if the firm’s surplus from implementing
the project is proportional to the capital invested instead of a constant amount.
11We thus model the loss from project failure as an opportunity cost, reflecting the fact
that, in practice, there is a lag between the capital raising and the actual investment decision.
This formulation is mathematically equivalent to one in which, instead of the agents forgoing
an outside option, a failure corresponds to an unsuccessful investment that depletes a portion
of the invested capital.
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I is realized, the project is implemented if and only if the capital raised by the
firm exceeds I, and payments are made.
1.2 Firm’s problem
The firm wishes to guarantee its maximum possible payoff. Its problem is to
choose a payoff-maximizing scheme subject to satisfying its budget constraint
and to inducing a unique equilibrium outcome.
As further discussed in Section 1.3, we focus on contracts that are bilateral
and simple. For each n ∈ S, the firm specifies an amount of capital xn ∈ [0, xn]
and returns (rn, kn) conditional on agent n investing xn in the firm’s project.
The return rn is the net return that agent n receives if the project succeeds; the
return kn is the agent’s net return in the case of failure.
Given a scheme specifying investments (xn)n∈S and returns (rn, kn)n∈S, de-
note agent n’s decision by yn ∈ {0, 1}, where yn = 1 means invest xn with
the firm and yn = 0 means invest xn in the safe asset. The firm’s budget con-
straint requires that the total payments offered to the agents do not exceed the
firm’s final capital, regardless of the set of agents who invest in the project and
whether or not the project is implemented. That is, for all profiles of choices
Y = (y1, . . . , yN), the firm’s scheme must satisfy12
N∑
n=1
rnynxn ≤ A and
N∑
n=1
knynxn ≤ 0. (BC)
In addition, the firm’s scheme must implement the agents’ investments in a
unique outcome. The firm’s problem can be decomposed in two steps:
(i) For fixed capital amounts (xn)n∈S, find the optimal return schedule (rn, kn)n∈S
guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S.
(ii) Given step (i), find the optimal capital amounts (xn)n∈S, where xn ∈ [0, xn]
for each n ∈ S.
12This budget constraint can be relaxed to only require budget balance on the equilibrium
path without altering our results. See our discussion in Section 1.3.
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We address step (i) in Section 2 and step (ii) in Section 3. We next formalize
step (i).
Fix capital amounts (xn)n∈S where, to avoid trivialities and without loss,
we take xn > 0 for each n ∈ S. Given (xn)n∈S, say that a return schedule
(rn, kn)n∈S is incentive inducing (INI) if Y1 ≡ (1, . . . , 1) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by (rn, kn)n∈S. An optimal return schedule for
the firm is a least-cost INI schedule. A technical issue is that the set of INI
schedules is open (since rn and kn take continuous values); we resolve this by as-
suming that agents invest with the firm when indifferent given their conjectures
of others’ behavior.13 Formally, let Un(yn,Y−n) be agent n’s expected return
on xn given net returns (rn, kn), investment choice yn, and investment choices
Y−n = (y1, . . . , yn−1, yn+1, . . . , yN) of the other agents:
Un(yn,Y−n) =
[
F
(
N∑
n′=1
yn′xn′
)
rn +
(
1− F
(
N∑
n′=1
yn′xn′
))
kn
]
ynxn+θ(1−yn)xn.
Given our assumption on behavior under indifference, we define a Nash equi-
librium as a profile Y = (y1, . . . , yN) such that, for each n ∈ S, yn = 1 if
1 ∈ argmaxy∈{0,1} Un(y,Y−n) and yn = 0 otherwise. Denote by E ((rn, kn)n∈S)
the set of Nash equilibrium profiles under schedule (rn, kn)n∈S. Then the firm’s
unique implementation requirement is:
E((rn, kn)n∈S) = {Y1}. (U)
Let XN ≡
∑N
n=1 xn. An optimal return schedule (r
∗
n, k
∗
n)n∈S guaranteeing
investments (xn)n∈S solves the following program:
V ((xn)n∈S) = max
(rn,kn)n∈S
{(
A−
N∑
n=1
rnxn
)
F (XN)−
N∑
n=1
knxn (1− F (XN))
}
(P)
subject to (BC) and (U).
13This assumption is equivalent to defining an optimal return schedule as a least-cost sched-
ule (rn, kn)n∈S such that, for any ε > 0, raising rn by ε for each n ∈ S yields an INI schedule.
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1.3 Discussion of assumptions
Before we solve the firm’s problem, it is worth discussing our model assumptions.
Unique implementation. We have assumed that the firm cannot coordinate
the agents to its preferred equilibrium when multiple equilibria exist. This
assumption is what motivates the requirement of unique implementation, both
in our paper and in related work (Segal, 2003; Winter, 2004; Bernstein and
Winter, 2012). If the firm could “pick” the equilibrium to be played by the
agents, then it would be able to extract the full surplus by specifying returns
(rn, kn) = (θ/F (XN), 0) for each n ∈ S and some (xn)n∈S. Under such a scheme,
there is an equilibrium that implements investments (xn)n∈S and keeps all agents
to their outside option, but equilibria with lower investment also exist. The
presence of multiple equilibria gives rise to the possibility that agents may play
a non-desirable one. Indeed, several experiments find that subjects are often
trapped in bad equilibrium outcomes in environments with externalities (see,
e.g., Devetag and Ortmann, 2007). This tendency bears on the fact that agents’
first order optimism alone would not suffice to ensure the good equilibrium: even
if an agent believes in the intentions of her peer to pitch in, it may be enough
for her to suspect that the peer might be pessimistic about her for the good
equilibrium to unravel.
Our unique implementation requirement is equivalent to having the firm
maximize its profits in the equilibrium outcome yielding the lowest profits for
the firm.14 While real-world firms and managers may not be directly worried
about this worst-case scenario, they do aim to ensure a minimum payoff. The
unique implementation solution provides insight into how these principals struc-
ture payments in order to avoid bad outcomes, without having to specify priors
over different action profiles, which may be arguably difficult in practice. One
can also view this worst-case focus as reflecting how the agents behave: if in-
vestors are reluctant to invest in the firm’s project unless they are sufficiently
compensated in every equilibrium outcome, then the firm’s worst equilibrium
outcome would indeed prevail.
14See Segal (2003) for a general argument.
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Another desirable feature of our solution concept is that it permits an anal-
ysis free of strong assumptions on agents’ ability to predict others’ behavior.
Specifically, we will show in Section 2 that our requirement of unique imple-
mentation in Nash equilibria yields a unique rationalizable outcome. The firm
therefore only relies on agents being rational and this rationality being common
knowledge, and not on agents being able to make correct conjectures of others
agents’ choices. This is in contrast with other approaches such as selecting equi-
libria based on the risk dominance criterion, which imposes strong demands on
the ability of agents to predict how others will behave.
Timing of moves. We have assumed that the agents make their investment
choices simultaneously, i.e. under imperfect information. This simultaneous
game is a simple (and stark) way to capture the fact that investors in real-
ity may have limited information about others’ investment choices, and their
decisions may not be sequential insofar as they can be revised.
Our analysis however also applies to a sequential game. Suppose that the firm
approaches the agents sequentially, with each agent observing the investment
decisions of her predecessors.15 Naturally, by offering rn = θ/F (XN) and kn = 0
to each agent n ∈ S, the firm can induce investments (xn)n∈S as the unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and extract the full surplus. But such a
solution appears unrealistic, as it requires investors to believe that others who
have not yet moved will choose to invest with the firm. Without these beliefs,
guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S amounts to making each of these a dominant
strategy in the underlying subgame of the sequential game, a solution concept
that is used in Innes and Sexton (1994) among others. One can show such an
approach yields the same results as our unique implementation requirement in
the simultaneous game.
The sequential moves specification is of interest in itself. This specification
imposes the weakest demands on agents’ information and behavior: when mak-
ing their investment decisions, agents are not required to know the structure of
the remaining game, the contracts offered to other agents, or how much capital
15The discussion that follows is valid regardless of whether the firm commits to the rules of
the game (i.e., the contracts and the order of moves) ex ante or not.
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other agents own. In fact, agents need not even know whether other agents
are rational, as they simply establish whether they want to invest with the firm
given the capital already accumulated, no matter what happens next.16 In terms
of our application, the sequential moves setting offers additional predictions on
the order in which the firm should approach investors to maximize profits. Our
results imply that, under the condition of Proposition 2, it is optimal for the
firm to first lock large investors and only then approach smaller investors.
Bilateral, simple contracts. Following the literature (Segal, 2003; Winter,
2004), we have assumed that the firm can rely on bilateral contracts only. That
is, contracts cannot directly condition on third parties’ actions: the payment to
an agent does not depend on other agents’ investment decisions except insofar as
these decisions affect whether the project gets implemented. The motivation for
this restriction stems from the difficulty to verify in practice the capital pledged
by third parties. If an agent sues for breach of contract, a court can require
the agent to prove that she invested with the firm (or else she lacks standing
to sue), and it can plausibly verify whether or not the firm implemented some
large project. It is less clear whether the court can identify the firm’s other
investors and the amounts that they may or may not have invested. We focus
on situations in which it cannot.17
Another assumption is that the firm uses “simple” contracts. Specifically,
our analysis abstracts from menu contracts in which the firm offers an agent n
different returns (rn(x
′
n), kn(x
′
n)) for different amounts x
′
n that the agent may
choose to invest. In a simple contract, the firm specifies an amount xn and
returns (rn, kn) conditional on the agent investing that amount (and zero returns
otherwise). Naturally, only simple contracts are relevant if agents’ decisions are
binary, as is the case when there are indivisibilities in investment.18 Moreover,
16Interestingly, since such a decision rule allows the investors to extract more surplus, it is
to their benefit—and they would want to tell the firm when negotiating the terms—that they
are reluctant to rely on speculations about the behavior of future investors.
17If instead contracts can condition on third parties’ choices, then it can be shown that the
firm would be able to extract the full surplus.
18Indivisibilities are common in applications where capital takes the form of a specific re-
source or skill, or where the project requires a number of discrete investments. See Section 5
for some examples.
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even when investment is fully divisible, we provide conditions in the Online
Appendix under which simple contracts are without loss of optimality.19
Budget constraint. We have required that the firm satisfy its budget con-
straint both on and off the equilibrium path. That is, the firm must be able
to follow through on its commitments to the agents regardless of which agents
decide to invest in the project.20 An alternative possibility would be to allow
the firm to offer any returns (rn, kn)n∈S that satisfy its budget constraint on the
equilibrium path (i.e. under the investments (xn)n∈S), and each agent n ∈ S
would then assess the credibility of her offer (rn, kn) according to her conjecture
of others’ behavior. We show in the Online Appendix that, given our focus on
unique implementation, both possibilities yield the same results. We regard the
stronger budget-balance condition as more plausible, since the irrational behav-
ior of some investors cannot serve the firm with an excuse for not fulfilling its
contracts with other investors.
2 Return Schedule
In this section, we address step (i) of the firm’s problem: for fixed capital
amounts (xn)n∈S, we study the firm’s optimal return schedule that guarantees
these investments, namely the schedule that solves program (P). Without loss,
we take xn > 0 for each n ∈ S. We begin by restating constraint (U) in program
(P) using the following equivalence:
Lemma 1. (U) holds if and only if there exists a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN)
of the set of agents such that, for each i ∈ S, agent ni is willing to invest with
the firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest with the firm, no matter what the other
agents do.
An optimal return schedule makes it iteratively dominant for each agent to
invest with the firm. To see why this follows from (U), note that uniqueness
of the full-participation equilibrium Y1 implies that there is an agent n1 who is
19See Segal (2003) for an analysis of menu contracts in a more general setting.
20This is analogous, for example, to the requirements in Holmstro¨m (1982).
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willing to invest with the firm when no other agent does. Moreover, existence
of this equilibrium implies that n1 is also willing to invest when all other agents
do. We show that as a result, n1 is willing to invest with the firm no matter
what the other agents do. The reason is that n1’s expected payoff from investing
is a weighted average of her returns under success and under failure, where the
weights are the probabilities of each event and thus achieve their highest and
lowest values when all and none of the other agents invest. Having established
this property for n1, we then use an induction argument to complete the proof
of the “only if” claim in Lemma 1.21
Given this result, an optimal schedule specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN)
of the set of agents and returns (ri, ki) for each agent ni ∈ S satisfying the cri-
terion in Lemma 1. We proceed by first characterizing the optimal returns
(r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S and then solving for an optimal permutation pi
∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N).
2.1 Optimal returns
Given a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN), denote the aggregate capital of the first
i agents in the permutation by Xi ≡
∑i
j=1 xnj , where we omit the dependence
on pi to ease the exposition. (Note that, as previously defined, XN corresponds
to the total amount of capital.) We obtain:
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists an optimal return schedule guar-
anteeing investments (xn)n∈S. Any such schedule specifies some permutation
pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns (r
∗
i , k
∗
i )i∈S such that, for each i ∈ S, agent ni
is indifferent over investing with the firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest with
the firm and agents (ni+1, . . . , nN) do not. Moreover, the following returns are
optimal:
r∗i =
θ
F (Xi)
and k∗i = 0.
An optimal schedule implies a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) such that the
first agent in the permutation is indifferent between investing and not when no
21The proof of Lemma 1 is general in that it does not rely on specific externalities between
the agents. The result will also apply to the setting studied in Section 4 in which the firm
owns some initial capital.
15
other agent invests, the second agent is indifferent between investing and not
when the first agent invests and the others do not, and so on. For intuition,
recall that by Lemma 1, there is a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) in which each
agent ni is willing to invest when agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest, no matter the
rest. This implies that for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ {i, . . . , N},
r∗iF (Xj) + k
∗
i (1− F (Xj)) ≥ θ. (1)
Now note that the firm’s budget constraint (BC) requires ki ≤ 0 for each
i ∈ S;22 given no initial capital of its own, the firm cannot credibly commit to
pay an agent a positive return under failure. Since the agents can obtain a net
return θ > 0 by investing in the safe asset, condition (1) then requires that the
firm offer a strictly positive net return ri > 0 under success. It follows that for
each i ∈ S,
r∗i > 0 ≥ k∗i , (2)
and thus the schedule induces strategic complementarities. That is, under an
optimal return schedule, each agent ni’s expected payoff from investing with the
firm is increasing in the other agents’ investments.
The strategic complementarities in turn simplify the agents’ participation
constraints. Given the inequalities in (2), we obtain that condition (1) is satisfied
for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ {i, . . . , N} if and only if it is satisfied for each i ∈ S
and j = i. Intuitively, the firm can induce agent ni to participate no matter
what agents (ni+1, . . . , nN) do if it can induce agent ni to participate when all
such other agents do not. Furthermore, we show that by optimality, condition
(1) must hold with equality for each i ∈ S and j = i: otherwise, the firm could
lower a return ri and increase its payoff while preserving the agents’ incentives
to participate and relaxing its budget constraint. Therefore, we obtain
r∗iF (Xi) + k
∗
i (1− F (Xi)) = θ (3)
for each i ∈ S. This yields the first part of Proposition 1, which, in the litera-
22(BC) requires that the sum of net returns under failure be non-positive for all profiles of
choices. Since any one agent being the only investor is a possible choice profile, this constraint
in turn requires that each agent’s net return under failure be non-positive.
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ture’s jargon, shows that any optimal scheme is a “divide and conquer” scheme.23
The second part of Proposition 1 uses the binding participation constraints
in (3) to derive optimal returns. We show that it is optimal to set (r∗i , k
∗
i ) =
(θ/F (Xi) , 0) for each i ∈ S.24 The idea is intuitive. The firm conditions on
all agents (n1, . . . , nN) investing in the project, whereas, as shown in (3), each
agent ni conditions on only agents (n1, . . . , ni) investing. Hence, for all i ∈ S,
the firm assigns a higher probability to success than agent ni does, which means
that the firm values ri relative to ki more than agent ni. As a consequence, the
firm benefits from reducing ri, and thus increasing ki, as much as it can, subject
to its budget constraint (BC) and the participation constraints in (3).
Formally, we show that if a return schedule specifies ki < 0 for some i ∈ S,
we can perform a perturbation in which we slightly increase ki and reduce ri so
as to keep the left-hand side of (3) unchanged. The perturbed schedule satisfies
the firm’s budget constraint and preserves the agents’ incentives to participate.
Moreover, we show that the perturbation increases the firm’s expected payoff in
(P). It follows that it is optimal to set k∗i = 0 and thus, by (3), r
∗
i = θ/F (Xi)
for each i ∈ S.25
Proposition 1 has important implications for the agents’ payoffs. The propo-
sition shows that the firm treats the agents symmetrically under failure: each
agent is refunded her capital if the project is not implemented. However, in
the case of success, returns differ across the agents. Given the permutation
pi = (n1, . . . , nN), agents who are positioned towards the beginning of the per-
mutation are offered a higher net return (per unit of capital invested) than those
positioned later in the permutation. The reason is that agents with a higher
rank i condition on a larger set of other agents investing with the firm; thus,
given the strategic complementarities, their participation constraints are less
costly to satisfy. Clearly, in light of this result, a key question is how an opti-
mal permutation pi∗ ranks the agents given the heterogeneity in the size of their
23See Segal (2003). Divide and conquer strategies are also discussed in the literature on
exclusionary contracts, including Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Innes and Sexton
(1994), and Segal and Whinston (2000).
24Given (BC), if the agents were protected by limited liability, then the firm would be
constrained to offer ki = 0 for all i ∈ S. Here we obtain these same returns under failure but
by optimality.
25These returns are strictly optimal for i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and weakly optimal for i = N .
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investments. We turn to this question in the next subsection.
A useful property of the returns in Proposition 1 is that they maximally
relax the firm’s budget constraint. Specifically, since k∗i = 0 for each i ∈ S,
these returns minimize not only the firm’s total costs but also its costs under
success,
∑N
i=1 rixni , for some permutation pi. It follows that an optimal return
schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S exists if and only if a schedule with
returns (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for some permutation pi satisfies (BC) given
(xn)n∈S. As formalized in the next corollary, the latter requires that the firm’s
surplus A from success be large enough.
Corollary 1. An optimal return schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S ex-
ists if and only if there exists a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) such that
θ
N∑
i=1
xni
F (Xi)
≤ A.
We end our discussion of Proposition 1 with a remark. As noted above,
the firm’s scheme induces a supermodular game among the agents, namely one
characterized by strategic complementarities. As a result, our requirement of
unique implementation in Nash equilibria also yields unique implementation in
rationalizable strategies.
Remark 1. Take an optimal return schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S.
Then these investments constitute the unique Nash equilibrium as well as the
unique rationalizable outcome.
2.2 Optimal permutation
We now turn to the question of how an optimal permutation ranks the agents.
Assume hereafter that the condition in Corollary 1 holds, so an optimal return
schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S exists. By Proposition 1, it is optimal
for the firm to specify some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) of the set of agents
and returns (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for each agent ni ∈ S. Substituting in the
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firm’s expected payoff yields
V ((xn)n∈S) =
(
A− θ
N∑
i=1
xni
F (Xi)
)
F (XN) (4)
for some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN). It follows from (4) and Corollary 1 that
a permutation pi is optimal if and only if it minimizes the firm’s costs under
success, given by
θ
N∑
i=1
xni
F (Xi)
. (5)
The next proposition shows that (5) is minimized by ranking the agents in
decreasing order of the size of their investments, provided that a condition on
the investment threshold distribution holds. This condition is that 1/F (x) be
convex (over the relevant range), and it is satisfied by most commonly used
distributions, as we explain subsequently (see Remark 2).
Proposition 2. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0. Then for any
investments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X, an optimal permutation is pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n∗N)
such that
xn∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ xn∗N (6)
Consequently, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors.
The logic for the optimal permutation is as follows. Given a permutation
pi = (n1, . . . , nN), Proposition 1 shows that an optimal return schedule com-
pensates each agent ni ∈ S on the marginal unit of capital invested in the
project. Specifically, for each unit invested by agent ni, the firm pays the
agent a return under success r∗i = θ/F (Xi). As discussed in Section 2.1, the
agent’s return thus decreases with Xi; moreover, if 1/F (·) is convex, θ/F (Xi)
decreases at a decreasing rate with Xi. This means that the firm benefits from
moving down the return curve as quickly as possible: the faster capital is ac-
cumulated along the sequence (xn1 , . . . , xnN ), the lower is the sum of returns
xn1θ/F (X1) + xn2θ/F (X2) + . . .+ xnN θ/F (XN) that the firm has to pay under
success. It follows that it is optimal to rank the agents in decreasing size order,
from the largest investor to the smallest one.
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Intuitively, to guarantee investment, the firm has to compensate the agents
for the strategic risk that they face in addition to the fundamental risk. The risk
premium for agent ni is proportional to 1/F (Xi), which depends on the agent’s
rank i and her investment xni . For any given rank, a large investor demands
a lower risk premium than a small one because her large investment secures
itself. That is, given Xi−1 fixed, a larger investment xni allows to reduce the
risk premium 1/F (Xi−1 + xni) that the firm has to pay on each unit of capital
invested by ni. Now the magnitude of this reduction depends on Xi−1: if 1/F (·)
is convex, the risk premium decreases most sharply with ni’s investment when
the aggregate investment Xi−1 of preceding agents is small, and thus when ni’s
rank i is low. As a consequence, placing large investors early in the permutation
minimizes the total risk premia that the firm has to pay when 1/F (·) is convex.26
Figure 1 illustrates the result using the example described in the Introduc-
tion. We take F uniform over [0, 30] and θ = 10%. The figure depicts the
return curve θ/F (Xi), showing that the return that the firm pays under success
declines at a decreasing rate with each additional unit of capital invested in the
project. For N = 2 agents with investments x1 = 10 and x2 = 20, Proposi-
tion 2 implies that the optimal permutation is pi∗ = (2, 1). That is, the firm sets
n∗1 = 2 and n
∗
2 = 1 as agent 2’s investment is larger than agent 1’s. As shown
in the left panel of Figure 1, the optimal returns under success are r∗1 = 15%
for agent n∗1 = 2 and r
∗
2 = 10% for agent n
∗
2 = 1, yielding a cost for the firm
of 20(15%) + 10(10%) = 4. If the firm instead ranks the agents according to
pi = (1, 2), as in the right panel of Figure 1, then the returns are r1 = 30%
for agent n1 = 1 and r2 = 10% for agent n2 = 2, yielding a higher cost of
10(30%) + 20(10%) = 5.
As stated in Proposition 2, our characterization of an optimal permutation
has direct implications on investors’ returns: given Proposition 1, it implies
that larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller ones. The analysis
therefore provides an explanation for the patterns of returns often observed
in practice. As mentioned in the Introduction, our results are consistent with
evidence from private equity. Tan (2016) and Clayton (2017), for example,
26Conversely, if 1/F (·) is concave, the firm would benefit from placing large investors late
in the permutation. See Section 5.
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Example
Suppose F uniform on [0, 3], ✓ = 10%, integer capital units
• Pay 30% on first unit, 15% on second, 10% on third
• If N = 2 with (x1, x2) = (1, 2), pay 15% to agent 2, 10% to agent 1
• Firm’s cost is 4. If reverse order in permutation, cost is 5
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
x2   x1
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Proportional surplus
5.3 Credibility of payments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding Remarks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
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Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform
over [0, 30], and ✓ = 10%, as
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 10 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
20
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Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform
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H of capital in S, and let bS e the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
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Our model therefor predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution f wealth fo ters e tre reneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. Th re is in fact empirical evidence
that we lth inequali y is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed o credit constraint and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs f raising capital to fund n w projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could h ve positiv e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other mportant negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship betwee he distribution of the agents’ initial
capi al and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that give a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we wo ld lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Fi ure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so th price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
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Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
ties. A more unequal distribution of we lth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus ability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature h s pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth equality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
nnovation, there are o her important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
O r last result co cerns he relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
c pital and the distribu of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to age t 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the resul in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distributio of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
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Our model therefore pr dicts hat i n vation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eti s. A m re un qual distrib ion of wealth fost rs entre reneu ship by increasing the
profi ability, and thus viabil ty, of ew proj ct . There is in fact mpirical ev de ce
th t w alth inequalit is positively corr a ed with entre rene rship (Naude´, 2010), and
t e litera ure has point d o credit constr ints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
expla ations. Our mode r veals a di↵erent mech ism, which operates d rectly v a an
en repreneur’ costs of raising capital to fund n w project . Of cours , while the result
sugg sts that w alth inequ l ty could have po itive e↵ects on social welfar by increasing
innovation, th re are other important neg tive welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last r sult conce ns the rela ionship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, a optimal scheme pays higher returns
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Figure 1: Return curve for F uniform over [0, 30] and θ = 10%. Given N = 2 agents
with investments x1 = 10 and x2 = 20, the left panel shows the returns paid by the
firm under the optimal permutation pi∗ = (2, 1). The right panel shows these returns
under pi = (1, 2).
point out n increasi g tendency of rivate equity firms to give preferential
treatment to limited partners based on size. The empirical findings in Dyck and
P morski (2016) reveal that large invest rs receive higher net returns than small
investors even when restricting attention t private equity investment without
any preferenti l cess.27
Proposition 2 suggests that the observed differences in returns across in-
vestors may arise as a firm’s profit-maximizing solution to a coordination prob-
lem in investment. A natural question is whether other factors could instead
explain the evidence. For example, a simple theory of transaction costs may
justify firms’ offering better terms to larger investors. However, the differential
returns across investors are sizable, so these transaction costs would have to
be too large to provide a justification. In fact, this discontinuity is a testable
implication of our theory that distinguishes it from other explanations such as
transaction costs: we find that small differences in agents’ investments can yield
large differences in the net returns that they receive.
By showing that larger investors get more per unit invested, Proposition 2
27From private conversations with industry experts, we find that similar patterns are ob-
served in debtor-in-possession financing, often in the form of fee reductions for large investors.
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also has implications for dynamic capital markets. In particular, we will estab-
lish in Section 3.1 that the agents from whom the firm induces larger invest-
ments are precisely those who have larger endowments of capital to begin with.
Therefore, as we discuss in that section, the differential treatment of investors
described in Proposition 2 will imply that any differences in initial capital among
the agents will be exacerbated by the firm’s optimal scheme.
We close this section with two remarks. The result in Proposition 2 is shown
to hold under a condition on the distribution of the investment threshold. First,
it is worth noting that this condition is implied by log-concavity:
Remark 2. If F (x) is log-concave, then 1/F (x) is convex.
Many familiar distributions have a log-concave cdf, including exponential,
gamma, log-normal, Pareto, and uniform (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).28
Second, one may wonder about the necessity of our condition on F . We
can show that if 1/F (x) is non-convex for some x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, then there
exist investments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X such that a permutation that ranks the
agents in decreasing size order is not optimal. Hence,
Remark 3. Convexity of 1/F (x) over the relevant range is not only sufficient
but also necessary for the statement in Proposition 2 to hold.
Our emphasis is on the case in which 1/F (x) is convex because, as noted,
most of the distributions that are frequently used satisfy this property. In fact,
1/F (x) cannot be globally concave (since 1/F (x) → ∞ as x → 0), and thus
an analysis under 1/F (x) concave must be conditioned on the range of capital
[min{xn|n ∈ S}, XN ] given (xn)n∈S. We discuss this possibility in Section 5.
3 Distribution of Capital
So far we have focused on step (i) of the firm’s problem, taking the amounts of
capital (xn)n∈S that the firm raises as given. We now consider step (ii): given
28Log-concavity of the cdf is implied by, but weaker than, log-concavity of the probability
density function.
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that an optimal return schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S is character-
ized by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we study the optimal investments that
the firm induces. Put differently, we ask: how does the distribution of capital
among the agents impact the firm’s payoff?
To address this question, we use the majorization partial ordering of vectors
(Hardy, Littlewood and Po´lya, 1934):
Definition 1. For two N-vectors x = (x1, . . . , xN) and x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂N), vector
x̂ majorizes x if the components of x̂ and x have the same total sum and, for
all m, the sum of the m smallest components is weakly smaller in x̂ than in x.
Majorization provides a formal definition of dispersion. Given a total invest-
ment XN , the investments in x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂N) are more unequal than those in
x = (x1, . . . , xN) if the vector x̂ majorizes x. This concept is analogous to that
of mean-preserving spread for probability distributions.29
3.1 Optimal investments
The next proposition shows that for any given total investment XN , the firm
benefits from the individual investments (xn)n∈S being more unequal:
Proposition 3. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and con-
sider investments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X. Let the investments (x̂n)n∈S majorize
(xn)n∈S. The firm’s expected payoff under (x̂n)n∈S is higher than that under
(xn)n∈S.
For intuition, consider the example from the Introduction, with F uniform
over [0, 30] and θ = 10%. Suppose first that the firm raised capital from N = 3
agents with x1 = x2 = x3 = 10. By our results in the previous section and as
can be seen in Figure 1, the firm’s optimal scheme would then entail costs equal
to 10(30% + 15% + 10%) = 5.5. Now suppose that two of these investors were
29For any x > 0, let Hx(x) and Hx̂(x) denote the number of components of x and x̂
respectively that do not exceed x. Then Hx̂(x) is a mean-preserving spread of Hx(x) if it
is second-order stochastically dominated by Hx(x). By the results in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970) and Machina and Pratt (1997), our analysis goes through without change with this
definition of inequality.
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“merged” into a single larger investor, so the firm raises capital from N = 2
agents with x1 = 10 and x2 = 20 (which is equivalent to N = 3 agents with
x1 = 10, x2 = 20, and x3 = 0). The firm’s costs under an optimal scheme would
then be lower, equal to 20(15%) + 10(10%) = 4. The reason is that merging
the agents reduces the strategic uncertainty: while each separate agent faces
uncertainty about the investment decision of the other agent, the merged agent
knows that she will invest the whole capital amount in the firm’s project. This
allows the firm to guarantee the same total investment at a lower risk premium.
Proposition 3 shows that this logic holds more generally. We find that
any increase in the dispersion of investments, as formalized by the notion of
majorization, increases the firm’s payoff. To see why this is the case, take
(xn)n∈S. Any capital amounts (x̂n)n∈S that majorize (xn)n∈S can be derived
from (xn)n∈S by performing a finite sequence of transfers from smaller to larger
investors, increasing the gap between them (see Hardy et al., 1934). We show
that each such transfer makes the firm better off. Fixing an optimal permuta-
tion pi = (n1, . . . , nN) under (xn)n∈S, a transfer from a small to a large investor
allows the firm to move down the optimal return curve θ/F (Xi) more quickly
and thus reduce its costs. Intuitively, the transfer lowers the required risk pre-
mium by increasing the self-insurance of the large investor. This implies that
the firm’s payoff under the induced amounts (x̂n)n∈S is higher than that under
(xn)n∈S given optimal returns and the original permutation pi. Clearly, changing
to a permutation that is optimal under (x̂n)n∈S can only raise the firm’s payoff
further. It follows that this operation always benefits the firm.
In the limit, the operation in Proposition 3 would concentrate all the capital
in one of the agents. In fact, if the firm raised capital from only one agent, this
agent would face no strategic risk, and the firm would be able to raise the total
investment XN by offering a net return under success equal to θ/F (XN). The
firm’s costs in this case would be minimized and equal to XNθ. The firm’s costs
are higher when raising capital from multiple agents because of the coordination
problem governing the agents’ interaction. The price of coordination is the addi-
tional cost above XNθ that the firm pays when dealing with N > 1 agents, given
by θF (XN)
∑N
i=1 xn∗i
(
1
F (Xi)
− 1
F (XN )
)
for Xi =
∑i
j=1 xn∗j . Proposition 3 implies
that the price of coordination is lower the more unequal the agents’ investments.
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Proportional surplus
5.3 Credibility of payments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding Remarks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
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Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform
over [0, 30], and ✓ = 10%, as
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 10 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneur hip (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
20
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Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
20
0
0.1
1 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3
Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
x2   x1
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Proportional surplus
5.3 Cr dibility of payments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding Remarks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply a p rmutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
18
Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Pro ortional surplus
5.3 Credibility of p yments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding Remarks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
18
Figure 3: Price of coordi atio for N = 2 agents with aggreg e capital X2 = 30, F uniform
over [0, 30], and ✓ = 10%, as
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 10 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitabilit , and thus viability, of n w projects. The e is in fact mpirical evidence
that wealth inequality is posi iv ly cor lated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constr ints a d di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵eren mech nism, hich operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme p ys higher returns
20
0
0.1
1 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3
Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence f the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
x2   x1
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s in tial cap tal
5.2 Proportio al u plus
5.3 Credibility of payments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding Remarks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We be in by proving tha (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as d scrib d in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), ther
18
Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
th dis ribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
5 E te sions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Propor io al surplus
5.3 Credibility of payments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding R marks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
18
Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform
over [0, 30], and ✓ = 10%, as
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
i creases from 10 t 3 .
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 10 20 30
Our model therefore pre icts that innovation will b higher in ore unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth foste s entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in f ct empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
20
0
0.1
1 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3
Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. T is i t e essence of the result i
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how t price of coordination defi ed in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price hen dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one sin le agen with c pital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The price of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small invest r 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
x2   x1
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Proportional surplus
5.3 Credibility of pa ments
5.4 Social planner
6 Concluding Rema ks
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 roof of Le ma 1
(=)) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply permuta io as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. No e that by (C2), ther
18
Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the es ence of the result in
Proposition 3.
F gure 3 show how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
are equal to 3(10%) = 0.3. The pri e of coordination for any   2 [0, 1) is equal to
✓(x2 +  )
⇣
1
F (x2+ )
  1
⌘
. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
transfer capital from the small investor 1 to the large investor 2.
✓
N=2X
i=1
xn⇤i
✓
1
F (X⇤i )
  1
F (XN)
◆
.
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
5 Extensions
5.1 Firm’s initial capital
5.2 Proportional surplus
5.3 Credibility of payments
5.4 Social planner
6 C ncluding Remark
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(=)) We b in by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
18
Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform
over [0, 30], and ✓ = 10%, as
 
xn⇤1   xn⇤2
 
increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than tha in S.
0 0 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovation will b higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distributio of wealth foste s entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evid nce
that wealth inequality is positively correlated wit entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanatio s. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
o r model does n t reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribu ion of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
20
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capital from multiple agents because of the coordination problem governing the agents’
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pays when dealing with N > 1 ag nts, give by
✓F (XN)
NX
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F (Xi)
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for Xi =
Pi
j=1 xn⇤j . Proposition 3 implies that the price of coordination is lower the
more unequal is the distribution of agents’ investments. Figure 3 provides an illustration
us g th xample discussed above.
Proposition 3 has immediate implications on the feasibility of investment. Since a
more unequal distributi n of capital among the agents increases the firm’s payo↵ fr
any given investment, such a distribution also reduces t e minimum surplus A th t is
required from a pr ject or investment to be profitabl . As a n quence, we find that
a larger range of projects can be undertaken when he population of investors is more
heterogeneous.
9
Figure 2: Price of coordination for F uniform ov r [0, 30], θ = 10%, and N = 2
ag nts with total investment X2 = 30, s we ncrease
(
x ∗
1
− xn∗2
)
from 10 to 30.
Figure 2 provides an illustration using the example discussed above.
Returning to the firm’s problem, the r sult n Proposition 3 mm diately
tells us what are the optimal inves ments (x∗n)n∈S that the firm induces from the
ag nts given their endowments of ca it l (xn)n∈S. For any given total investment
XN , we find that the fir raises as much capital as it can from the gents with
the largest endowments. This solution yi lds the most unequal investments
(xn)n∈S that are feasible given the ag nts’ endowme ts (xn)n∈S, and so it is
optimal by Pr position 3.
Corollary 2. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and agents’ en-
dowments satisfy
∑N
n=1 xn ≡ XN ≤ X. Consider a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN)
that ranks the agents in decreasing endowment order, i.e. with i ≤ i′ if and only
if xni ≥ xni′ . For any given total investment XN ≤ XN , an optimal scheme
specifies investments (x∗ni)i∈S satisfying
x∗ni =

xni if i < i
∗,
x∗ni∗ if i = i
∗,
0 otherwise,
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where i∗ ≡ max{i ∈ {0, . . . , N + 1} : ∑i<i∗ xni ≤ XN} and x∗ni∗ ≡ XN −∑
i<i∗ xni. Moreover, letting X
∗
i ≡
∑i
j=1 x
∗
nj
and noting that the investments
x∗ni are a function of XN , the optimal total investment X
∗
N then solves:
max
XN∈[0,XN ]
(
A− θ
N∑
i=1
x∗ni
F (X∗i )
)
F (XN) . (7)
Given the optimal individual investments as a function of XN , the second
part of Corollary 2 completes our characterization of the firm’s optimal scheme
by solving for the optimal total investment X∗N . The program in (7) follows
directly from our characterization in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Corollary 2 has several important implications. First, since agents with larger
endowments of capital make larger investments in the firm’s project, our findings
in Section 2 imply that agents with larger endowments receive higher net returns
on their investments than those with smaller endowments. As such, our analysis
highlights a mechanism through which capital becomes dispersed. We find that
the firm’s optimal scheme exacerbates differences in agents’ initial capital. In
fact, the results point to “winner-takes-all dynamics,” whereby agents with large
capital endowments become relatively larger over time, even when differences in
initial endowments may be small. These effects resemble those that arise, albeit
for different reasons, in tournament theory and models of superstars (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1981).30
Second, we find that the firm’s optimal scheme may imply differences among
the agents not only in their net returns from investment but also in their access to
investment opportunities. Specifically, if the total capital available XN exceeds
the amount X∗N that the firm optimally raises, then the firm targets the largest
investors and excludes smaller investors from the project.
Finally, our results have implications on the feasibility of investment. Since a
more unequal distribution of capital among the agents increases the firm’s payoff
from any given total investment, such a distribution also reduces the minimum
30In a dynamic setting, further considerations may come into play, as the firm could po-
tentially offer returns as a function of an agent’s history of investments. See Rey and Tirole
(2007) for an insightful related study in the context of cooperatives. A dynamic analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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surplus A that is required from a project for investment to be profitable. As a
consequence, we find that a larger range of investments can be undertaken when
the population of investors is more heterogeneous.
3.2 Distribution of returns
Our last main result concerns the relationship between the distribution of agents’
investments and the distribution of their net investment returns. Consider an
optimal return schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S. By Proposition 1
and Proposition 2, the schedule specifies a permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) rank-
ing the agents in decreasing size order and yields each agent ni an expected
net return F (XN)r
∗
i . Since r
∗
i ≥ r∗i′ for i ≤ i′, the range of net returns is
equal to the difference between the largest and smallest investors’ net returns,
F (XN) (r
∗
1 − r∗N). We find that if the distribution of investments becomes more
unequal, the range of net returns declines:
Proposition 4. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and con-
sider investments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X. Let the investments (x̂n)n∈S majorize
(xn)n∈S. The range of net returns offered by the firm under (x̂n)n∈S is smaller
than that under (xn)n∈S.
Recall that any investments (x̂n)n∈S that majorize (xn)n∈S can be obtained
from the latter by performing a finite sequence of transfers from smaller to larger
investors. To prove the proposition, we show that any such transfer keeps the
smallest investor’s net return unchanged (and equal to θ) while reducing the
largest investor’s net return (strictly if the transfer increases this investor’s cap-
ital). These effects apply regardless of whether the identities of the smallest and
largest investors change, and they imply that the range of net returns becomes
smaller. In this sense, we find that the firm’s scheme is less discriminatory when
the agents are more heterogeneous.
The example from the Introduction offers an illustration. For F uniform
over [0, 30] and θ = 10%, compare two agents who invest the capital amounts
(x1, x2) = (10, 20) against two agents investing (x̂1, x̂2) = (6, 24). Under an
optimal return schedule, agent 1 and agent 2 receive expected net returns of 10%
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and 15% respectively in the former case, whereas in the latter case these expected
net returns are 10% and 12.5%. The range of net returns is therefore smaller
under the more unequal distribution of capital: (12.5− 10)% < (15− 10)%.
Of course, the range of agents’ initial capital amounts is larger under the
more unequal distribution. In the example, this range is 20− 10 under (x1, x2)
and 24− 6 under (x̂1, x̂2). The net effect of heterogeneity on the range of final
capital is thus unclear, as final capital holdings depend on both the agents’
investments and their net returns. In the example, the range of final capital is
larger under (x̂1, x̂2): 24(1 + 12.5%)− 6(1 + 10%) > 20(1 + 15%)− 10(1 + 10%).
More generally, either direction is possible depending on parameters. That is,
perhaps surprisingly, we find that by reducing the range of net returns, a more
unequal distribution of initial capital can lead to a more equal distribution of
final capital.31
4 Firm’s Initial Capital
Our model has considered a firm which owns no initial capital, so any payments
it offers to the agents must be self-financed by its project. In this section, we
study how the firm’s problem changes when the firm has some capital of its
own. We show that our main qualitative results continue to hold, with larger
investors receiving higher net returns than smaller ones. What is new is that
the firm now uses its funds to insure part of the investment, and we are able to
provide a characterization of the level of insurance offered to different investors
depending on their size.
Suppose the firm has initial capital W > 0 and wishes to raise an additional
amount XN from the set S of N agents. Consider a scheme specifying invest-
ments (xn)n∈S and returns (rn, kn)n∈S, where without loss we take xn > 0 for
each n ∈ S. The firm’s budget constraint now requires that, for all profiles of
31For an example, take F (x) = x5 for x ∈ [0, 1], θ = 10%, and capital amounts (x1, x2) =
( 13 ,
2
3 ) and (x̂1, x̂2) = (
1
4 ,
3
4 ). The range of final capital is 0.81 under (x1, x2) and 0.79 under
(x̂1, x̂2).
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agents’ choices Y = (y1, . . . , yN), the scheme satisfy
N∑
n=1
rnynxn ≤ W + A and
N∑
n=1
knynxn ≤ W. (BCW )
If W ≥ θXN , the problem is trivial: the firm can offer net returns (rn, kn) =
(θ, θ) to each agent n ∈ S and fund its project at the safe rate. As all the agents
are given full insurance, there is no coordination problem among them. In what
follows, we thus assume that the firm’s capital is limited, satisfying W < θXN .
The firm’s problem is the same as that in (P) but with the budget con-
straint given by (BCW ) above (and with the total investment in the project now
including the firm’s capital W in addition to the capital XN raised from the
agents). To solve this problem, observe first that Lemma 1 continues to hold in
this setting. Given investments (xn)n∈S, the firm’s return schedule must thus
specify a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) such that, for each i ∈ S, agent ni is
willing to invest when agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest, no matter the rest. The key
difference relative to the analysis of Section 2.1 is that the firm can now pay
positive returns under failure, and hence, in principle, offer returns satisfying
ki > ri to some agent ni ∈ S. Such an agent’s expected payoff from investing
with the firm would be decreasing in the other agents’ investments. That is,
unlike when W = 0, inducing strategic substitutabiliy is now feasible.
Nevertheless, we are able to show that an optimal return schedule for the
firm induces strategic complementarities among all the agents. Suppose by
contradiction that ki > ri for some agent ni ∈ S in any optimal schedule. Such
an agent’s participation requires ki > θ, and so by (BCW ) and W < θXN ,
there must exist j 6= i with kj < θ < rj. Furthermore, by analogous logic as
in Section 2.1, agent ni must be indifferent over investing with the firm when
all other agents invest, whereas agent nj must be indifferent conditioning on
only agents (n1, . . . , nj−1) investing. This means that agent ni conditions on
weakly more other agents investing, and hence on a weakly higher probability
of success, than agent nj. We thus consider a perturbation that reduces ki and
increases ri while at the same time increasing kj and reducing rj. We show that
this perturbation either contradicts the optimality of the original schedule or
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allows us to construct another optimal schedule which satisfies ri ≥ ki for all
i ∈ S.
Using the strategic complementaries, we obtain the following characteriza-
tion:
Proposition 5. Consider the firm’s problem with initial capital W > 0. Suppose
1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and there exists an optimal return
schedule guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S with W +XN ≤ X. Then an optimal
such schedule specifies a permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) satisfying
xn∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ xn∗N
and returns (r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S satisfying
k∗i =
min{θxn∗i ,Wi}
xn∗i
and r∗i =
θ − k∗i (1− F (W +Xi))
F (W +Xi)
,
where Xi =
i∑
j=1
xn∗j , WN ≡ W, and Wi ≡ max{W −
N∑
j=i+1
k∗jxn∗j , 0} for i ∈
{1, . . . , N − 1}.
An optimal scheme for the firm includes full-insurance contracts, with returns
under success and failure equal to the safe rate θ. That is, we find that the firm
uses its initial capital W to fully insure some of the capital XN that it raises
from the agents. Since W is limited, only an amount of capital W/θ can be
insured. Once W is depleted, the firm faces the same problem that we solved
in the previous sections, and hence it guarantees investment using a schedule
analogous to that characterized in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 shows that the smallest investors are the ones who receive in-
surance. The intuition is simple. The firm’s cost of fully insuring the portion
of capital W/θ is equal to W and thus independent of how this capital is dis-
tributed among the agents. In contrast, the firm’s cost of raising the additional
capital XN −W/θ does depend on its distribution: by Proposition 3, this cost is
minimized when XN −W/θ is raised from the largest investors. Consequently,
it follows that it is optimal for the firm to raise the fully insured portion W/θ
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from the smallest investors.
The characterization in Proposition 5 shows that our results in Section 2 and
Section 3 are robust to the firm owning initial capital.32 In addition, this charac-
terization offers predictions on the levels of risk afforded to investors of different
size. Interestingly, empirical studies find that large investors hold riskier portfo-
lios than small investors, and some of the explanations discussed in the literature
include capital market imperfections and investors’ risk aversion declining with
wealth (see Carroll, 2000).33 We contribute to this discussion from a different
perspective, that of optimal design. Proposition 5 indeed predicts a high-risk,
high-return investment for large investors and a low-risk, low-return investment
for small investors. Here, however, the distinction arises as an optimal solution
to the firm’s problem of raising capital in the presence of strategic risk.
5 Discussion
Below we discuss some extensions and applications of our model and results.
Social planner and policy implications. We have solved the problem of
a firm that seeks to maximize its profits while guaranteeing a unique outcome.
We point out here that our results also have implications for a social planner
who internalizes agents’ welfare.
Consider the problem of a planner who maximizes the probability of project
success, subject to budget and unique implementation constraints as those in
program (P). Because the budget constraint requires limiting the cost of raising
capital, the solution to this problem coincides with that of the firm when the
budget constraint is tight enough, namely when the surplus A from project
success is sufficiently small. Specifically, the planner may have to give higher
net returns to larger investors compared to smaller investors in order to be
able to finance the investment in the project. Furthermore, the planner may
32Note that the smallest investors who receive full insurance also receive a lower net return
on their investment compared to other investors, since θ ≤ F (W+XN )r∗i +(1−F (W+XN ))k∗i
for any i ∈ S.
33Capital market imperfections may cause entrepreneurs to finance their activities with their
own capital and to earn a high return on their investments.
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benefit from a more unequal distribution of capital among the agents, as such a
distribution allows to reduce costs and make the investment viable.
Of course, things change if we take different social welfare functions, and
in particular if we include a concern for inequality. Our analysis shows that
the need to address strategic risk gives rise to an important tradeoff between
equality and efficiency.
Policy responses aimed at limiting inequality should support small investors,
who we find will be at a disadvantage relative to larger investors. A direct
measure would be to prevent the use of differential returns based on investor
size, either by regulation or by design. For example, in the context of venture
capital, all participants of the same investment round receive the same price,
as the firm has only one valuation at any given point in time. Our model and
results show that constraining differential pricing can protect small investors
from getting worse terms than others, possibly at the expense of a lower revenue
for the firm or greater strategic uncertainty.
Intermediaries that bundle the capital of small private investors into a single
larger investment could also help limit inequality, provided that they do not
extract any additional surplus by charging high fees. Additionally, regulators
can generate instruments to facilitate coordination. For example, it may be
possible to promote platforms where small investors can make commitments to
invest that are legally binding but contingent on a minimum total investment.
Such instruments would reduce the strategic risk which, we have shown, drives
inequality.
Threshold distribution. Our analysis has focused on situations in which
the distribution F of the investment threshold satisfies the condition of 1/F (x)
being convex. As noted in Section 2.2, 1/F (x) cannot be globally concave, and
it is indeed globally convex for most commonly used distribution functions. Yet,
it is worth considering how our results would change if the condition on F is
not met.
Given capital amounts (xn)n∈S, suppose 1/F (x) is concave over the whole
relevant range, namely for x ∈ [min{xn|n ∈ S}, XN ]. Then our results in Propo-
sition 2 would be reversed: given optimal returns (r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S as characterized in
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Proposition 1, we would find that an optimal permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N)
ranks the agents in increasing as opposed to decreasing size order. The intu-
ition is the same as in Proposition 2 but also reversed: the firm benefits from
placing large investors in the permutation according to when the risk premium
drops most sharply with investment, and if 1/F (x) is concave, this occurs at the
end of the permutation, when Xi =
∑i
j=1 xnj is largest. The implication is that
larger investors would now receive lower net returns than smaller investors, as
opposed to the case in which 1/F (x) is convex. The contrasting results that we
obtain in the two cases offer predictions that could be empirically tested.
Regarding the analysis in Section 3, we maintained the assumption of 1/F (x)
convex throughout that section for consistency with our results in Section 2.
However, our results on the distribution of capital in Section 3 are more gen-
eral. In fact, if 1/F (x) is concave over the whole relevant range, one can follow
the same proof strategy used for Proposition 3 to verify that the result sill ap-
plies, namely that the firm benefits from distributions of capital which are more
unequal.
General equilibrium. We have taken a standard mechanism design approach
by considering a single firm that makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the agents.
We assumed that the agents have the same outside option and differ only in
their wealth, which is the focus of our study. From a theoretical perspective,
this monopolistic setting permits a clean analysis where differential returns are
not driven by considerations other than wealth. From an applied perspective,
while there are multiple entrepreneurs with whom an investor may choose to
contract in practice, these markets are far from competitive. Entrepreneurs do
not sell “identical goods,” and shifting from one enterprise to another is costly.
Indeed, investors spend substantial time and effort on understanding the nature
of the enterprise they may invest in (see, e.g., Fried and Hisrich, 1994), which
creates a holdup problem and grants entrepreneurs a certain degree of monopoly
power. This does not mean that investors’ only outside option is a risk-free asset,
but we believe modeling the outside market as one in which investors are price-
takers approximates reality better than a model in which they can costlessly
switch entrepreneurs.
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That said, it is still of interest to explore how our analysis translates to a
competitive market setting. With that goal, we study in the Online Appendix a
simple extension of our model in which two firms compete for the capital of two
heterogeneous investors. In this oligopolistic environment, the investors’ outside
options are not necessarily the same, as they are endogenously determined by
the firms’ equilibrium offers which can condition on investor size. Analogous
to our analysis of the one-firm problem, we study equilibria where the firms’
offers yield a unique outcome in the interaction between the investors (given an
assumption on behavior under indifference) and where, upon a firm’s deviation,
the investors play the equilibrium that is worst for the firm. We show that under
weak conditions, our main qualitative results continue to hold: in equilibrium,
larger investors receive higher expected returns than smaller investors, on a
per-dollar basis.
Proportional surplus. Our model has assumed that project success yields a
fixed surplus A > 0, and only the probability of success varies with the amount of
capital invested in the project. More generally, the surplus from project success
may also be a function of the investment. Consider a simple case in which
success yields a net surplus Rx if capital x is invested in the project, for some
R > θ. Given a scheme specifying investments (xn)n∈S and returns (rn, kn)n∈S,
the firm’s budget constraint then requires that, for all profiles Y = (y1, . . . , yN),
N∑
n=1
rnynxn ≤
N∑
n=1
Rynxn and
N∑
n=1
knynxn ≤ 0. (BCR)
Relative to the original budget constraint (BC), this constraint places further
restrictions on the firm’s scheme. In fact, note that given R, (BCR) implies (BC)
under a fixed surplus AR ≡ RXN , as both constraints require that the sum of
payments under success do not exceed this amount. But (BCR) adds restrictions,
by requiring that the payment to any agent under success be no larger than the
surplus generated by the project when only such an agent has invested. That
is, the firm’s budget constraint now requires maxn∈S rn ≤ R.
Despite this difference, we can show that our analysis continues to apply
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to this setting. Specifically, given R, consider the firm’s problem in (P) when
project success yields a fixed surplus equal to AR. As just explained, this is a re-
laxed problem relative to the firm’s proportional surplus problem that is subject
to (BCR). Hence, it follows that if the solution to (P) described in Proposition 1
and Proposition 2 satisfies (BCR)—namely, if this solution specifies r
∗
n∗1
≤ R—
then it is also a solution to the firm’s proportional surplus problem. Moreover,
note that among all return schedules guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S subject
to (BC), the solution to (P) minimizes the highest return that the firm has to
pay to any agent n ∈ S under success. Therefore, if the solution described in
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 specifies r∗n∗1 > R, no schedule can guarantee
investments (xn)n∈S while satisfying (BCR).
Applications. We have formulated our problem in the context of a firm that
raises capital to fund a project. There are various examples that may fit this
description. As mentioned, our results resonate with evidence from private
equity investments. The project in our model could also concern the building of a
property to which agents contribute with purchase commitments, or fund-raising
for a charity as in Andreoni (1998). We next discuss some further applications
that relate to other literatures.
Exclusive contracts: A number of influential papers study how an incumbent firm
may coordinate buyers on signing exclusive dealing contracts (see Rasmusen,
Ramseyer and Wiley, 1991; Innes and Sexton, 1994; Segal and Whinston, 2000).
Our analysis can be applied to this question. Consider an incumbent monopolist
offering exclusive dealing contracts to buyers of different size, namely who differ
in the number of units that they demand.34 A potential entrant enters the mar-
ket only if the total demand that has contracted with the monopolist is below
a stochastic threshold, and the monopolist offers prices contingent on entry to
guarantee a given total demand. Our results suggest that under certain condi-
tions on the threshold distribution, the monopolist will offer lower unit prices
to larger buyers compared to smaller ones. Moreover, the more heterogeneous
34Note that due to compatibility and cost considerations, these demands are often indivisi-
ble.
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the buyer population, the higher the monopolist’s incentive to offer exclusive
dealing contracts to fight market entry.
Joint task: Consider a team incentive problem similar to that in Winter (2004)
but allowing for heterogeneity. A principal contracts with multiple agents who
can contribute towards a joint task. Agents differ in their ability, with more
skilled agents being able to make larger contributions than less skilled ones.
Suppose that the probability of completing the joint task is increasing in the
sum of agents’ contributions, and the principal offers rewards contingent on
task completion in order to guarantee a level of participation. Applying our
results to this setting suggests that optimal rewards will be convex: the principal
compensates agents with high ability more than proportionally relative to those
with lower ability.
Bank runs: A sizable literature studies bank runs and how to prevent them.
Consider a simple setting in which N agents have their funds deposited in a
bank and can withdraw them at any time. Suppose there is a random threshold
such that if the total withdrawal exceeds it, a bank run occurs and the bank
collapses. To exclude a run, the bank can offer depositors collateral (to be paid
in the case of a run) or a higher interest rate on deposits (absent a run). A
conjecture that can be derived from our analysis is that large depositors will be
treated more favorably than small ones even on a per-dollar basis, whether it is
collateral or an increased interest rate that is used to prevent the run.
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A Proofs
This Appendix provides proofs for the results in Section 2 and Section 3. Supple-
mentary proofs and results can be found in the Online Appendix. We abbreviate
Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
As defined in Section 2.1, denote the aggregate capital of the first i agents in a
permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) by Xi ≡
∑i
j=1 xnj .
(=⇒) We begin by proving that (U) implies a permutation as described in
the lemma. Suppose (U) holds. Note that there must exist an agent n1 who is
willing to invest with the firm when no other agent does. If this was not true,
there would be a NE in which no agent invests, contradicting (U). Hence, we
have:
r1F (X1) + k1 (1− F (X1)) ≥ θ. (8)
Additionally, agent n1 must be willing to invest with the firm when all other
agents do. Otherwise, there would not be a NE in which all agents invest with
the firm, contradicting (U). Hence, we also have:
r1F (XN) + k1 (1− F (XN)) ≥ θ. (9)
For any set of agents SI ⊆ S, let X(SI) ≡
∑
i∈SI xni be the aggregate capi-
tal of the agents in SI . Since F (X1) ≤ F (X1 +X(SI)) ≤ F (XN) for SI ⊆
{2, . . . , N}, equations (8) and (9) imply
r1F (X1 +X(SI)) + k1 (1− F (X1 +X(SI))) ≥ θ
for all SI ⊆ {2, . . . , N}. Therefore, agent n1 is willing to invest with the firm no
matter what the other agents do.
We now proceed by induction: for any i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, suppose that
there is an agent ni who is willing to invest with the firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni−1)
invest, regardless of what the other agents do. Then there must be an agent ni+1
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who is willing to invest with the firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni) invest and the other
agents do not. Otherwise, there would be a NE in which agents (n1, . . . , ni)
invest with the firm and agents (ni+1, . . . , nN) do not, contradicting (U). Thus,
we have
ri+1F (Xi+1) + ki+1 (1− F (Xi+1)) ≥ θ. (10)
Moreover, by (U), agent ni+1 must also be willing to invest with the firm when
all other agents do:
ri+1F (XN) + ki+1 (1− F (XN)) ≥ θ. (11)
Since F (Xi+1) ≤ F (Xi+1 +X(SI)) ≤ F (XN) for SI ⊆ {i+2, . . . , N}, equations
(10) and (11) imply
ri+1F (Xi+1 +X(SI)) + ki+1 (1− F (Xi+1 +X(SI))) ≥ θ
for all SI ⊆ {i + 2, . . . , N}. Therefore, agent ni+1 is willing to invest with the
firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni) invest with the firm, regardless of what the other
agents do.
(⇐=) We next prove that a permutation as described in the lemma implies
(U). First, note that since each agent ni ∈ S is willing to invest if (n1, . . . , ni−1)
invest no matter what the rest does, it must be that each agent ni is willing to
invest when all other agents invest. Hence, there exists a NE in which all agents
invest.
Next, to show uniqueness, suppose towards a contradiction that there exists
a NE in which some agents do not invest with the firm. Recall that all such
agents must strictly prefer not to invest. Call the set of non-investing agents
SNI . We claim that SNI must be empty. Clearly, n1 cannot be in SNI , as n1
is willing to invest with the firm no matter what the other agents do. So n1
must be in the set of agents who invest, call it SI . Now proceed by induction:
for any i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, suppose agents (n1, . . . , ni) are in SI . Then by the
permutation stated in the lemma, agent ni+1 is willing to invest with the firm,
and thus she cannot be in SNI either. The claim follows.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by proving the first part of the proposition. By Lemma 1, any op-
timal return schedule specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns
(ri, ki)i∈S which satisfy, for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ {i, . . . , N},
riF (Xj) + ki (1− F (Xj)) ≥ θ. (12)
As argued in the text, the firm’s budget constraint (BC) requires ki ≤ 0 for each
i ∈ S. Given this and θ > 0, equation (12) then requires ri > 0 for each i ∈ S.
It follows that ri > 0 ≥ ki for each i ∈ S, and thus the left-hand side of (12) is
increasing in F (Xj). Since F (Xj) is increasing in j, it follows that (12) holds
for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ {i, . . . , N} if and only if, for each i ∈ S,
riF (Xi) + ki (1− F (Xi)) ≥ θ. (13)
We show that optimality requires (13) to hold with equality for each i ∈ S.
Suppose by contradiction that there is an optimal return schedule under which
(13) holds as a strict inequality for some i′ ∈ S. Then consider a perturbation
in which we reduce ri′ by ε > 0 arbitrarily small while keeping all other returns
unchanged. Since (13) was a strict inequality for i′, this constraint continues
to be satisfied for all i ∈ S. It is also clear that the budget constraint (BC) is
relaxed by the perturbation. Moreover, note that the firm’s expected payoff is(
A−
N∑
i=1
rixni
)
F (XN)−
N∑
i=1
kixni (1− F (XN)) , (14)
which is decreasing in ri for any i ∈ S. Therefore, we obtain that the perturba-
tion increases the firm’s expected payoff while preserving the agents’ incentives
to participate and the firm’s budget constraint, and thus the original return
schedule cannot be optimal.
We next prove the second part of the proposition. By the claims above,
any optimal return schedule specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and
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returns (ri, ki)i∈S satisfying
riF (Xi) + ki (1− F (Xi)) = θ (15)
for each i ∈ S. We show that it is optimal to set ki = 0 for each i ∈ S,
which combined with (15) implies ri = θ/F (Xi) for each i ∈ S. Suppose by
contradiction that this is not the case, i.e. any optimal schedule has ki′ < 0 for
some i′ ∈ S. (Recall that by the firm’s budget constraint, ki ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S.)
Then consider the following perturbation: for any such i′, we increase ki′ by
ε > 0 arbitrarily small and reduce ri′ by εηi′ , where
ηi′ ≡
1− F (Xi′)
F (Xi′)
.
Since we had ki′ < 0, the perturbed schedule continues to satisfy the firm’s
budget constraint (BC). Moreover, by construction, the left-hand side of (15)
is unchanged by the perturbation, so the agents’ incentives to participate are
preserved. Finally, note that the perturbation changes the firm’s expected payoff
in (14) by
ε
(F (XN)− F (Xi′))
F (Xi′)
,
which is positive (and strictly positive if i′ ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}). Therefore, the
perturbation increases the firm’s expected payoff while preserving the agent’s
incentives to participate and the budget constraint. Since we can perform this
perturbation whenever ki < 0 for some i ∈ S, this contradicts the assumption
that an optimal schedule with ki = 0 for each i ∈ S does not exist.
Finally, we prove that if an optimal return schedule given investments (xn)n∈S
exists, there exists an optimal schedule specifying some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN)
and returns (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for each i ∈ S. As shown above, any opti-
mal schedule specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns (ri, ki)i∈S
such that (15) holds for each i ∈ S. It is clear that for each agent ni, the return
ri that satisfies this binding participation constraint is decreasing in ki. Thus,
given a permutation pi, setting ki as high as possible for each i ∈ S, subject
to (BC), minimizes the firm’s costs under success,
∑N
i=1 rixni . It follows that
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setting ki = 0 for each i ∈ S maximally relaxes the firm’s budget constraint. As
we have shown that setting (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for some permutation pi is
optimal subject to the budget constraint, this proves the claim.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that 1/F (x) is convex for all x ∈ [0, XN ]. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. Define
Ψ (a, b, c) ≡ 1
c
(
1
F (a+ b)
− 1
F (a+ b+ c)
)
− 1
b
(
1
F (a+ c)
− 1
F (a+ b+ c)
)
.
(16)
We show that for any a ≥ 0 and b > c > 0 satisfying a+ b+ c ≤ XN ,
Ψ (a, b, c) ≤ 0. (17)
To prove this claim, observe that
Ψ (a, b, c) =
1
c
∫ b+c
b
F ′ (a+ z)
(F (a+ z))2
dz − 1
b
∫ b+c
c
F ′ (a+ z)
(F (a+ z))2
dz.
Define ψ (z˜) = cz˜+b
2−c2
b
. Note that ψ is linear with ψ (c) = b, ψ (b+ c) = b + c,
and ψ′(z˜) = c
b
. Hence, a change of variables yields:
Ψ (a, b, c) =
1
b
∫ b+c
c
(
F ′ (a+ ψ(z˜))
(F (a+ ψ(z˜)))2
− F
′ (a+ z˜)
(F (a+ z˜))2
)
dz˜. (18)
Note that given b > c, ψ (z˜) ≥ z˜ for all z˜ in the integration region. Given a ≥ 0
and a + b + c ≤ XN , the assumption that 1/F (x) is convex for all x ∈ [0, XN ]
then implies that the integrand in (18) is (weakly) negative. The claim follows.
Step 2. By Step 1, (17) holds for any a ≥ 0 and b > c > 0 satisfying a+b+c ≤
XN . Using (16), this inequality can be rewritten as
b
F (a+ b)
+
c
F (a+ b+ c)
≤ c
F (a+ c)
+
b
F (a+ b+ c)
. (19)
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We now show that there is an optimal permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) satis-
fying
xn∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ xn∗N . (20)
Suppose that some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) is optimal. If pi satisfies (20),
we are done. Suppose instead that (20) is not satisfied. Take the lowest index
j < N for which xnj < xnj+1 . We perform a perturbation in which we swap
agents nj and nj+1. Note that this swap has no effect on Xi for any i < j or
i > j+ 1. Hence, the perturbation only affects the terms j and j+ 1 of the sum
in the firm’s costs in (5). Under the original permutation, these terms sum to:
xnj
F
(
Xj−1 + xnj
) + xnj+1
F
(
Xj−1 + xnj + xnj+1
) . (21)
The perturbation changes the sum of these terms to:
xnj+1
F
(
Xj−1 + xnj+1
) + xnj
F
(
Xj−1 + xnj + xnj+1
) (22)
Letting a = Xj−1, b = xnj+1 , and c = xnj , it follows from (19) that the sum
in (22) is no larger than the sum in (21). Therefore, the perturbation (weakly)
reduces the firm’s costs and thus increases the firm’s expected payoff. Note that
we can proceed by performing this perturbation for the next pair of agents with
(higher) indices (i, i+ 1) such that xni < xni+1 , repeating until the permutation
satisfies (20). Since each perturbation increases the firm’s expected payoff and
the original permutation was optimal, we obtain that a permutation satisfying
(20) is optimal.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The capital amounts (x̂n)n∈S can be obtained from the original amounts (xn)n∈S
by performing a finite sequence of transfers from smaller to larger investors
(Hardy et al., 1934). Thus, it suffices to show that each such transfer makes
the firm better off. Without loss of generality, consider the first such transfer.
Let the permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) be optimal under (xn)n∈S. Take any two
agents nj and n` where j < ` and, thus, xnj ≥ xn` . For any ∆ ∈ (0, xn` ], let
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(x̂n)n∈S be the result of transferring ∆ units of capital from agent n` to agent
nj. We will show that the firm’s minimized costs under (x̂n)n∈S are lower than
its minimized costs under (xn)n∈S when keeping the permutation pi unchanged.
Since the transfer does not change the probability of project success (as it does
not affect the total amount of capital invested in the project), it will follow
that the firm’s expected payoff under (x̂n)n∈S is higher than that under (xn)n∈S
when keeping the permutation pi unchanged. Clearly, changing to a permutation
that is optimal under (x̂n)n∈S can only increase the firm’s payoff from these
investments further, so this is sufficient to prove the claim.
To show that the transfer from agent n` to agent nj reduces the firm’s costs
when keeping the permutation unchanged, note first that the costs from returns
paid to agents ni with ranks i < j or i > ` are unaffected. The change in the
firm’s minimized costs in (5), divided by the constant θ > 0, is thus equal to
∆
F (Xj + ∆)
− ∆
F (X`)
−
`−1∑
i=j
[
xni
F (Xi)
− xni
F (Xi + ∆)
]
. (23)
Replacing F (Xj + ∆) by F (Xj) and xni by xni+1 , (23) is no larger than
∆
F (Xj)
− ∆
F (X`)
−
`−1∑
i=j
xni+1
[
1
F (Xi)
− 1
F (Xi + ∆)
]
.
This expression can be rewritten as
∆
`−1∑
i=j
xni+1Λi,
where
Λi =
1
xni+1
[
1
F (Xi)
− 1
F
(
Xi + xni+1
)]− 1
∆
[
1
F (Xi)
− 1
F (Xi + ∆)
]
=
1
xni+1
∫ Xi+xni+1
Xi
F ′ (z)
(F (z))2
dz − 1
∆
∫ Xi+∆
Xi
F ′ (z)
(F (z))2
dz.
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Define ψ (z˜) =
xni+1 z˜−Xi(xni+1−∆)
∆
. Note that ψ is linear with ψ (Xi) = Xi,
ψ (Xi + ∆) = Xi +xni+1 , and ψ
′(z˜) =
xni+1
∆
. Hence, a change of variables yields:
Λi =
1
∆
∫ Xi+∆
Xi
(
F ′ (ψ(z˜))
(F (ψ(z˜)))2
− F
′ (z˜)
(F (z˜))2
)
dz˜. (24)
Since ∆ ≤ xn` and xn` ≤ xni+1 for all j ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, we have ∆ ≤ xni+1 for all
j ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Thus, one can verify that ψ (z˜) ≥ z˜ for all z˜ in the integration
region and j ≤ i ≤ `−1. Given Xi ≥ 0 and Xi+xni+1 ≤ XN for all j ≤ i ≤ `−1,
the assumption that 1/F (x) is convex for all x ∈ [0, XN ] then implies that the
integrand in (24) is (weakly) negative. It follows that Λi ≤ 0 for all j ≤ i ≤ `−1,
so the change in costs in (23) is no larger than a (weakly) negative number. The
claim follows.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and pi = (n̂1, . . . , n̂N) be optimal permutations under
(xn)n∈S and (x̂n)n∈S respectively, where we consider only agents with strictly
positive investments. The smallest investor’s expected net return is the same
under (xn)n∈S and (x̂n)n∈S, as it is equal to F (XN) θF (XN ) = θ regardless of how
XN is distributed among the agents. The largest investor’s expected net return
is equal to F (XN)
θ
F (xn1 )
under (xn)n∈S and F (XN) θF (x̂n̂1 )
under (x̂n)n∈S. Recall
that the capital amounts (x̂n)n∈S can be obtained from (xn)n∈S by performing a
finite sequence of transfers from smaller to larger investors (Hardy et al., 1934).
It follows that x̂n̂1 ≥ xn1 , and since F is increasing, the largest investor’s net
return is weakly lower under (x̂n)n∈S compared to (xn)n∈S. The claim follows.
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